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MacIntyre's liberal-bashing provocative. Thus I recommend the book both
for its rich historical narrative, which is interesting quite apart from the
philosophical lessons MacIntyre tries to extract from it, and as a useful
antidote to liberal complacency, which lingers in academic circles despite the
fact that liberalism has fallen on hard times in the political arena.

NOTES
1. John Rawls, "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical," Philosophy & Public
Affairs, Vol. 14, No.3 (Summer 1985), p. 225.
2. John Courtney Murray, S.J., We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the
American Proposition (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1964).

Thomistic Papers IV, edited by Leonard A. Kennedy. Houston: Center for
Thomistic Studies, 1988.207 pp. $23.95 Cloth; $12.95 Paper.
MICHAEL L PETERSON, Asbury College.
This book is mandatory reading for those interested in the contemporary
discussion of the epistemology of religion. Leonard Kennedy, editor of the
previous two volumes in the Thomistic Papers series, has assembled a group
of very capable Thomist scholars dedicated to the defense of Thomistic natural theology, which is criticized in Faith and Rationality (Plantinga and
Wolterstorff, eds. 1983). In this spirited fourth volume of Thomistic Papers,
"Thomistic epistemologists" Henry Veatch, Henri DuLac, Thomas Sullivan,
Dennis McInerny, Richard Connell, Joseph Boyle, and Thomas Russman
sally forth against the "Reformed Epistemologists" in Faith and Rationality.
Most chapters in Thomistic Papers IV target the chapters in Faith and Rationality by Plantinga and Wolterstorff; one chapter scrutinizes Alston's work;
a small part of one chapter comments briefly on one of Mavrodes' stories
and a part on Marsden's work. This review discusses all of the chapters in
the book, but gives slightly greater emphasis to those by Veatch, McInerny,
and Boyle.
Henry Veatch sets the stage for discussion by devoting most of his lengthy
chapter to the analysis of Plantinga's piece "Reason and Belief in God."
Veatch affirms at the outset the essential agreement between Thomistic and
Reformed thinkers: that one chief aim of Christian philosophy is the exhibition of the rationality of the Christian faith. The great differences lie in how
the two groups of scholars conceive of this project.
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Veatch correctly understands that Plantinga's objection to natural theology
is that it rests on classical foundationalism and evidentialism. However, he
mistakenly attributes to Plantinga an understanding of foundationalism which
holds that all foundational propositions are self-evident and then tries to
exempt Aquinas from that brand of foundationalism by indicating that he
recognizes empirical knowledge. Actually, Plantinga defines classical
foundationalism as the view that a well-formed noetic structure contains
propositions which are known directly by virtue of being self-evident or
evident to the senses or incorrigible. Evidentialism is the view that all beliefs
must be either foundational propositions or derived inductively or deductively from foundational propositions. According to the evidentialist model,
religious beliefs must be supported by either deductive or inductive inference
from foundational beliefs. Providing such support has typically been taken
to be the task of traditional natural theology.
While admitting that strict evidential ism is much too rigorous to make
sense of religious believing as well as many other legitimate forms of believing, Veatch takes strong exception to Plantinga's attack on foundationalism.
Against Plantinga, he argues that foundationalism is not a faulty picture of
knowledge, that not all versions of foundationalism are self-referentially
incoherent, and that a feasible version of foundationalism can be constructed.
Veatch later criticizes Plantinga's positive alternative to foundationalismthe view that a person can be rationally justified in accepting "basic propositions" without inferential support from other propositions and that such
propositions, in appropriate circumstances, are delivered to one's consciousness by "belief dispositions" (e.g., memory, perception, and even a sense of
divinity) which are built into our human noetic equipment. Hence, Plantinga
can say that belief in God can be epistemically basic, although it does not
meet classical foundationalist and evidentialist requirements.
In responding to Plantinga, Veatch makes two main points. First, he argues
that Plantinga's notion of belief-producing mechanisms or belief dispositions
plays into an elementary confusion of reasons with causes, a confusion which
could render most if not all of human belief formation a purely nonrational
process (pp. 40-46). Second, Veatch accuses Plantinga of inconsistency in
advocating that a basic proposition is one which a person would be entirely
rational in accepting although there is no reason whatsoever for accepting it
(p.52).
Veatch's second point here betrays an outright misunderstanding of
Plantinga's distinction between having rational warrant for a belief (i.e.,
epistemic justification) and having reasons for that belief (Le., discursive
arguments), a misunderstanding which surfaces in various ways in several
subsequent chapters. However, this misunderstanding is partially explicable
along the following lines. Both sides seem to construe the concept of giving
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a reason so narrowly that they confine it, say, to the complex arguments of
the Five Ways. Since there are identifiable contexts in which a person can be
entirely rational in believing in God without being able to supply any semblance of natural theology, the Reformed thinkers hold that we need not give
a reason for believing in God. Yet, since the Thomist thinkers are convinced
that there must be a fundamental sense in which we can give a reason for
belief in God, they confidently defend natural theology and tend to characterize their opponents as advocating willy-nilly believing.
Obviously, there is room for a more thorough and sympathetic understanding of the Reformed epistemologists' case before clear battle lines can be
drawn. The irony which emerges from Veatch's misinterpretation here is that
his essay, as distinct from the others in the book, is somewhat sarcastic in
tone, often suggesting that Plantinga and other Reformed epistemologists
simply misinterpret Aquinas and his intellectual followers.
DuLac's very brief chapter tries to clarify various issues which he finds
confused in Faith and Rationality. For instance, DuLac also rehearses the
standard Thomistic view on the respective roles of the natural intellect and
divine grace in coming to religious belief, insisting that for one to believe in
God because of the evidence is not necessarily to preempt his or her having
legitimate faith-a point which he takes his Reformed opponents to have
missed. While DuLac makes some strides in the Thomist-Calvinist controversy, he oversimplifies Plantinga's position somewhat and fails to explore
several allusions in Plantinga's writings to the contexts in which giving
arguments for belief in God is acceptable.
In a very interesting essay, Sullivan does not mount a frontal assault on the
position of Plantinga, Wolterstorff, and company so much as he seeks to go
further than they do in the rebuttal of anti-theistic critics. Sullivan explains
that these critics maintain that we have an intellectual obligation-indeed,
an ethical obligation-to believe only those propositions for which we have
adequate evidence. Plantinga et alia respond by arguing that it can be within
our epistemic rights, and thus ethically permissible, to believe that God exists
as a properly basic proposition. Borrowing heavily from Cardinal Newman,
Sullivan declares not merely that it can be within our epistemic rights to
believe, but that we can actually have an ethical obligation to believe in the
existence of God, if so believing is indispensable to some worthy end (p. 91).
Sullivan does not discuss, however, how his case, which assumes that we can
choose to believe for the sake of worthy ends, relates to Plantinga's suggestion that our beliefs may not be under our volitional control.
McInerny's chapter is a direct reply to William Alston's article "Christian
Experience and Christian Practice" in Faith and Rationality. Alston's burden
is to consider whether and in what specific way Christian experience (Le.,
the experience of leading the Christian life, broadly and ecumenically con-
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ceived) makes some contribution to the rationality of Christian belief. Developing his case around the concept of an epistemic practice, Alston focuses
on the suggestive analogies between what might be called Perceptual Practice
(PP) and Christian Practice (CP): just as we have the practice of taking perceptual experience as a basis for perceptual beliefs, there is the practice among
Christians of taking Christian experience as a basis for Christian beliefs.
McInerny counters that the significant disanalogies between PP and CP
render Alston's case unconvincing. Among the major dissimilarities, according to Mcinerny, are the way belief functions within each practice (in CP
belief seems constitutive of the practice whereas in PP no antecedent belief
is necessary), the function or end of the practices involved (PP produces or
establishes a belief, but CP confirms a belief or set of beliefs already held), and
the kind of knowledge involved (in PP mere "brute sensation" forms the basis
for judgments, while in CP we have highly interpreted sensations, or, better,
"ideologically interpreted sensations" (p. 112». Mcinerny's own positive position is revealed in his distinction between the two kinds of knowledge, saying
that perceptual knowledge is purely natural whereas Christian faith is supernaturally donated to the believer, a divinely bestowed gift which surpasses
what our natural noetic powers can deliver. He thus contends that Alston
mistakenly explains the Christian epistemic practice in terms of our natural
powers when a supernaturalistic explanation is more adequate.
While leading the reader through some new criticisms and suggestions not
anticipated in Alston's important and provocative work, McInerny'S piece
has not definitively laid to rest Alston's contention that there is a significant
sense in which Christian Practice is indeed rational or is a justified epistemic
practice. First, his attempt to drive a wedge between PP and CP by arguing
that the former relies on uninterpreted sensation whereas the latter relies on
ideological or world view commitments deserves further discussion. But this
tactic initially seems naive about much of the contemporary literature on the
conceptual conditioning of perceptual as well as other kinds of experience.
Second, his introduction of supernatural grace into the matter-while neither
Alston nor any other adherent to orthodox, historical Christianity would rule
out its role-shifts the discussion of just how much our natural epistemic
procedures can deliver to an entirely different issue which Alston did not
intend to address.
Connell's chapter is an attack on another aspect of what is perceived to be
the Plantinga-Wolterstorff position. Connell contends that the Reformed
epistemologists' rejection of classical foundationalism and advocacy of the
claim that rational beliefs is "person-specific" (p. 136) lands their theory of
rationality in an insidious form of epistemic relativism and distorts their
interpretations of the theistic proofs offered by Aquinas. Connell explains
that the Five Ways are merely summaries of more lengthy and sophisticated
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arguments which are meant only for those who are philosophically adept. Of
course, merely to bolster the Five Ways with background information is not
to refute the accusation that the whole foundationalist-oriented project of
traditional natural theology is a misguided endeavor.
Boyle's chapter follows a two-fold strategy: to defend something like the
classical foundationalist's criterion for basicality and to rebut Plantinga's
argument that belief in God is properly basic in a way not accounted for by
this criterion. Boyle argues that the foundationalist criterion is neither false
nor self-referentially incoherent, as Plantinga charges. Focusing on ancient
and medieval versions of foundationalism (as distinct from modern versions
of foundationalism which include an incorrigibility requirement), Boyle employs the concept of the "immediately evident" to capture the central conviction of the view (p. 178). He argues that nothing could be more reasonable
than to require that basic propositions in the foundation of a rational noetic
structure be immediately evident. Moreover, Boyle argues that the requirement that basic propositions be immediately evident is a criterion which itself
seems self-evident. Thus, Plantinga is also incorrect in claiming that the
foundationalist criterion is self-referentially incoherent by virtue of its not
being either a basic proposition or supported by basic propositions.
Boyle then turns to Plantinga's claim that belief in God, although it does
not meet the criterion of classical foundationa lism, is properly basic. In the
end, Boyle resorts to his concept of the immediately evident as the ha I1mark
of basicality and says that "Plantinga gives no reason for thinking that belief
in God is immediately evident, and does not argue that such a belief can be
properly basic even though it is not immediately evident" (p. 183). It is not
clear, however, that Boyle's appraisal rests on a sufficiently thorough appreciation of Plantinga's treatment of proper basicality. For one thing,
Plantinga's analysis ofbasicality certainly makes the point that properly basic
propositions are not known on the basis of other propositions. And his treatment of belief in God putatively shows that it need not be known on the basis
of other propositions. Now, surely, being-known-but-not-being-known-onthe-basis-of-other-propositions is roughly equivalent to Boyle's concept of
being-immediately-evident. For another thing, Plantinga's fuller exposition
of the idea of cognitive faculties (with their attendant belief dispositions) and
of the idea of appropriate circumstances (with their role of conferring justification on beliefs whose formation they influence) ought to be taken as part
of his overall argument.
Russman's chapter attempts to establish that all mainline Christian thought
must be foundationalist in character and that "Reformed Epistemology" is
quite a foundationalist enterprise, contrary to the way in which it officially
styles itself. The great gulf between Reformed epistemology and Thomistic
epistemology, as Russman sees it, consists in their very different versions of
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foundationalism. The real issue between the Reformed epistemologists and
the classical foundationalists whom they attack is not whether foundationalism is an adequate theory, but what sorts of propositions can be in the foundations of a rational noetic structure and what conditions for basicality shall
be invoked. Points in Russman's piece for further discussion include his
imputing to the Reformed epistemologists a doctrine of innate ideas and his
claiming that they advocate an incontrovertible divine guarantee of our
knowledge claims about God.
Thomistic Papers IV is rich and profitable reading. Given this reviewer's
sympathy with the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, it was especially enjoyable to peruse what appears to be the first major collaborative statement of
the Thomistic critique of Reformed epistemology. The reader will likely
arrive at a mixed assessment of the book, finding it strong on some points
and somewhat weak on others. For example, the Thomist authors succeed in
casting doubt on the Reformed epistemologists' presentation of Aristotle and
Aquinas, and in pressing for a discussion of what it means to have reasons
for belief. However, the Thomist authors sometimes seem to misunderstand
precisely what their Reformed counterparts are saying and thus risk unnecessary polarization. In conclusion, all of us should hope that the ThomistCalvinist dialogue-carried one important step further by the present
volume-will continue.

Religious Belief and The Will, by Louis P. Pojman. New York: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1986. Pp. xiii and 258. $32.50 in cloth.
NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, Yale University.
Pojman's discussion is divided into two parts, of approximately equal length.
The first is a survey of various positions taken in the history of Western
philosophy on the relation of belief and the will, with special emphasis on
religious belief. The second is a systematic discussion of the issues raised in
the first part. To the best of my knowledge there is no other book-length
discussion of this topic-this in spite of the fact that most major philosophers
have taken up or assumed positions on the maUer, and in spite of the fact that
since the 19th century the relation of belief to the will has been the focus of
sharp, and generally indecisive, debate.
Anyone who has studied closely what some figure from the history of
philosophy had to say on the relation of the will to belief will, I think, find
Pojman's discussion of the philosopher falling within his or her area of
expertise not very satisfactory. This for two reasons. Pojman's overall interpretation of the philosophers he treats are, in all cases, conventional treat-

